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Pharos Enterprises did not deposit funds in its checking
account at Commercial Security Bank pursuant to normal
bank checking procedures in order to make the check good.
Instead Pharos delivered a cashier's check for $16,500.00
made payable to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" to Commercial
Security Bank and instructed it to wire the money represented
by the cashier's check to the payees in Idaho.

Commercial

Security agreed to wire the funds to "F. Robertson and C.
Harrison".

(R. 135, Tr. 56)

During the transfer of

funds, Commercial Security or its employees or agents chemged
the designation of payees from "F. Robertson and C. Harrison"
to F. Robertson or C. Harrison."

(R. 135)

Because of the

change, C. Harrison was able to get the funds without Robertson's
knowledge or consent (R. 135)
Harrison can now be located.

and neither the funds nor
(Tr. 40-41, 43 and 46)

In exchange for the cashier's check, Pharos received
from appellant its own check which had been returned for
insufficient funds.

(Tr. 7, 61 and 75)

This transaction

was clarified at trial by the testimony of Mr. Mallacher as
follows:
Q. Mr. Mallacher . . . you stated twice
your testimony that the check was purchased
by Pharos. What did you mean when you said
purchase by Pharos?
A. Instead of Pharos applying some money
to their account they merely gave us the
money and picked up the check.
Q . . . So that transaction didn't go through
normal banking, checking channels, did it?
A.

No.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT CARL HARRISON
IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS LAWSUIT.
The determination of whether a party is indispensable
is one of equity and fairness.

The primary consideration is

whether the court can make an equitable adjudication without
joinder of the absent party.

The decision rests upon the

balancing of two opposing policies.
1(19.07 [1]

3A Moore's Federal Practice

On one side is the desirability of a complete

and final decree among all interested parties coupled with
an interest in preventing multiple lawsuits.

Opposing this

is the desirability of allowing the parties some adjudication
rather than leaving them remediless because of an ideal
desire to have all interested persons before the court.

Id.

Following these principles, the Supreme Court has stated that,
". . . there is no prescribed formula for determining in every
case whether a person or a corporation is an indispensable
party or not."

Nites-Bement-Ponds Co. v. Iron Moulder's Union,

254 U.S. 77, 80 (1920).
The Utah rule on joinder of indispensable parties is
a copy of the federal rule and is codified in Rule 19 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

It does not change the principles

of indispensable parties developed by caselaw, but seeks to
embody those concepts in a rule.

3A Moore's Federal Practice

1(19.01 [1] and 19.01 [2] it reads as follows:

-3-

(a) NECESSARY JOINDER. Subject to the
provisions of Rule 23 and of (b) of this rule,
persons having a joint interest shall be
made parties and be joined on the same side
as Plaintiffs or Defendants. When a person
who should join as a plaintiff refuses to
do so, where his consent cannot be obtained, he
may be made a defendant, or in proper cases,
involuntary plaintiff.
(b) EFFECT THE FAILURE TO JOIN. When persons
who are not indispensable, but who ought to be
parties if complete relief is to be accorded
between those already parties, have not been
made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction
of the court as to service of process, the
court shall order them summoned to appear
in the action. The court in its discretion
may proceed in the action without making such
persons, parties, as such jurisdiction over
them can be acquired only by their consent
or voluntary appearance; but the judgment
rendered therein does not affect the rights
or liabilities of absent persons.
Because the above rule does not clearly state the
principles for joinder of indispensable parties, it was revised
in 1966 and the revisions were adopted by the Federal Courts,
Id.

Utah has not yet adopted the 1966 revision but its

language is applicable because it is a restatement of the law
as developed under the original Rule. Id..

The federal rule

states that a party is indispensable if:
(1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or
(2) he claims an interest relating
to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action
in his absence may (i) as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any
of the persons already parties subject to
a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations
by reason of his claimed interest."
-4-

The striking similarity of this language to the
holding of the following Utah Supreme Court case is not surprising if it is remembered that the basis for the rule
was founded on existing caselaw.

In South Kamas Irrigation

Co. v. Provo Water User Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 225, 350 P.2d 851,
852 (I960), the Utah Supreme Court held that a party is
indispensable when:
(1)

the suit would have no direct affect between

the parties before the court without joinder of the
absent party, and
(2) judgment against one of the parties could
not be enforced without enforcing it against the absent
party.
The law developed above as applied to the facts of
this case leads to the conclusion that Carl Harrison is not an
indispensable party to this suit.

The facts indicate that

Pharos Enterprises gave the appellant, Commercial Security
Bank, a cashier's check for $16,500.00 and instructed it to
wire the funds to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" as joint
parties.

(Tr. 56 and 75)

During the transmission of the wire,

the "and" in the original instructions was changed by appellant
or its agents

(R. 127) to "or" enabling Harrison to get the

wired funds without Robertson's knowkedge or consent. (Tr. 6)
This suit is brought to recover for damages caused Mr.
Robertson by appellant's improper transfer of funds.

It is

founded in negligence and the duty imposed on a bailee when

-5-

he fails to deal with the bailed property as instructed.
It is a tort action and appellant admits this in the "Nature
of the Case" section of its brief by stating that this is a
suit to recover for negligence.

Carl Harrison has no interest

in this case as it is appellant's negligence not his that is
in issue.

A finding that Commercial Security Bank was negligent

will not affect Mr. Harrison either way.
Applying the requirements for an indispensable party
as found in the revised Rule 19 clearly shows that Carl
Harrison does not qualify.

First, complete relief can be

accorded between the existing parties in his absence.

The

duty of the appellant and the breach thereof by it or its
agents does not involve Mr. Harrison.

He was net responsible

for the change in wording which enabled him to receive the
wired funds without Robertson's knowledge.

Perhaps Mr. Harrison

will be held ultimately responsible for the loss with
Commercial Security recovering indemnification from him, but
that doesn't change the question of appellant's improper conduct
and it is not in issue in this lawsuit.

Second, the testimony

at trial established that Mr. Harrison had no interest in
the wired funds (R. 8 Tr. 8)

He, therefore, has no interest

which needs protecting or could be prejudiced by this lawsuit.
Even if he had an interest in the funds, he has received the
full $16,500.00 and cannot recover against appellant for its
negligence or on any other theory.

Furthermore, Appellant

will not be prejudiced if Carl Harrison is not joined in this
lawsuit.

Appellant can still seek indemnification from

Mr. Harrison for any amounts paid to Mr. Robertson.

-6-

As between

Mr. Robertson, who is completely without fault, and Commercial
Security Bank, the latter should suffer the consequences
resulting if Mr. Harrison is not available or is judgment proof.
If Mr. Harrison can be contacted as easily as appellant
implies in its brief, why didn't Commercial Security Bank join
him as a third party defendant rather than waiting for trial
to bring up for the first time that he was an indispensable
party and that the case should be dismissed?
In addition to Rule 19, the guidelines laid down
by the Utah Supreme Court in South Kamas establish that Carl
Harrison is not an indispensable party.

First, this suit does

have a direct affect between the present parties without the
joinder of Harrison.

The issue presented is the negligence

of Commercial Security.

A finding can be made as to that

and damages awarded without Harrison being made a party.
Harrison was not an agent of Commercial Security.
was he employed by them.

Neither

His actions do not enter into a

determination of the negligence of Appellant.

The second

element of an indispensable party found in South Kamas is also
missing as the judgment can be enforced against Commercial
Security Bank without enforcing it against Mr. Harrison.
As discussed earlier, Mr. Harrison is not responsible for the
negligence of appellant.

Judgment against Commercial Security

for its negligence can therefore be enforced without enforcing
it against Mr. Harrison.

Mr. Harrison will not be required

to pay the funds to Mr. Robertson.

In fact, he will not

even participate in the enforcement of the judgment against
Commercial Security.

-7-

Appellantfs brief fails to analyze the law of indispensable parties and apply it to the facts of the instant case
as is required.

Nites-Bement/ Supra.

Instead it concludes

that this case deals with the enforcement of a negotiable
instrument made payable to joint payees by labelling it as
such and then cites cases which state that joint payees are
indispensable parties to the enforcement of the instrument.
Also, the directed verdict for plaintiff was given on a
negligence theory rather than one found under negotiable instrument
law as that was the only one offered by plaintiff's counsel
(Tr. 79). The problem with appellant's approach is that
the facts do not coincide with its conclusion.

If the

original check made payable to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison"
which was returned for insufficient funds, had been deposited
in an Idaho account and then shipped to Commercial Security
Bank through banking channels, appellants characterization
of the law and facts may have been correct.
are not the facts.

But such

The record clearly shows that

possession of the check was returned to Pharos Enterprises.
(Tr. 75)

It was not even presented to Commercial Security

for payment.

Pharos did not deposit funds in its Commercial

Security checking account and write a new check or send the
returned one to Idaho.

Instead, it handed the equivalent of

cash, a cashier's check for $16,500.00, to appellants officer
and instructed him to wire it to Idaho.

This suit was not

brought to enforce the returned check on the cashier's check.
It was brought for improper transfer of a cashier's check by
wire.

As such, appellant's arguments on indispensable parties

-8-

do not apply.
Even assuming that the U.C.C. and negotiable instruments law applies, Appellant has misconstrued the facts as
the wired money was not made payable jointly but alternatively
to "F. Robertson or C. Harrison."

(Exhibits 4-D and 1-D)

Because the funds were made payable in the alternative, all of
the payees are not required to join in a suit for its enforcement.

U.C.A. 70A-3-116.

In such a case, Carl Harrison would

not be an indispensable party.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN GRANTING A
DIRECTED VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF.
A directed verdict may properly be given pursuant
to Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when
". . . there are no controverted issues of fact upon which
reasonable men could differ," 5A Moore's Federal Practice
1150.02 [1] or where there is a complete absence of proof
as to a material issue to a defense or claim.
Gribble, 20 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973).

Anderson v.
The latter

basis for directed verdict is merely a degree of the first
as a complete absence of proof necessarily means that reasonable
minds could not differ.
The trial court did not error in granting a directed
verdict for the Respondent because viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to appellant reveals that Commercial
Security failed to meet its

burden of proof by showing

-9-

that it was not negligent in the transfer of the wired funds.
Not only did Commercial Security fail to meet its
burden, but the record indicates a complete absence of
proof by appellant as to due care or non negligent conduct.
By way of contrast, the plaintiff-respondent offered evidence
through an officer of Commercial Security showing that the
improper transfer of funds would not have occurred if normal
procedures had been used and that someone must have made a
mistake, indicating negligence. (Tr. 51-61).
The Rule established by the Utah Supreme Court is
that a bailee being sued for destruction or loss of bailed
property has the burden of showing that the loss was not
caused by his negligence.

Wyatt v. Baughman, 121 Utah 98,

239 P.2d 193 (1951); Romney v. Covey Garage, 100 Utah 167,
11 P.2d 545 (1941);

Clark-Nomah Flying Club v. Sterling

Aircraft, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 245, 408 P.2d 904 (1965).
In Wyatt at 195, the Utah Court stated that they were aware
of the difficulties facing a bailor or third party in trying
to determine the cause of the loss and to offset that difficulty
they held that the rule adopted earlier in Romney must be applied
which places " . . . the burden [upon the] bailee to show
that the damage or loss was not due to his negligence and he
stands the risk of non-persuasion on this point."

The court

went on to say at 195 that,
[I]n bailment cases for loss or destruction
of, or damage to, the res, the law gives
the bailor the "presumption" of negligence upon
the part of the bailee which is sufficient
to require a judgment in his favor as a matter
of law unless the bailee presents some evidence
-10-

to show his freedom from negligence, and
when in the face of such evidence by the
bailee, the law continues an "inference" of
negligence to be weighed by the trier of fact
against bailee's evidence of non-negligence,
as we hereafter more fully explain, it has
given to the bailor all of the advantage which
is required to place him on a parity with plaintiffs
in other tort cases, without requiring the bailee
at his absolute peril to affirmatively and
specifically explain the cause of the loss or
damage.
The above rule applies to the instant case as the
facts describe a bailment with Commercial Security as the bailee
o f funds.

A bailment exists when personal property is

delivered to another person for a particular prupose and after
the purpose is fulfilled the property will be returned or
dealt with as the bailor directs.

H.S. Crocker; Co>^v* McFaddin,

148 CA. 2d 639, 307 P.2d 429 (1957); 7 C.J.S. Bailments §1;
Freeman v. Metro Transmission, Inc., 533 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1975).
In the present case, Pharos Enterprises, as bailor, delivered
personal property, a cashiers check, to Commercial Security
Bank, as bailee, for the purpose of transferring the funds
represented thereby, by wire to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison"
as joint payees.

The funds were wired, but as to Mr. Robertson

they were lost because the wire was made payable to the
payees in the alternative enabling Carl Harrison to get
the funds and take them for his own use without Mr, Robertson's
knowledge.

Because Commercial Security accepted the respon-

sibility of a bailee and the wired funds were lost, it has
the burden of showing that the loss was not due to its negligence.
Wyatt, supra.

The record indicates that appellant failed

to meet that burden of proof.

In fact, there is a complete

-11-

absence of proof on that matter.

In such a case the law

gives Respondent a ". . . presumption of negligence on the
part of the bailee which is sufficient to require a judgment
in his favor as a matter of law. . . " Wyatt at 195.
By giving judgment of directed verdict for respondent as a
matter of law, the trial court was not abusing its discretion
but was merely following Utah law.
POINT III
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK IS RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE
FOR THE DAMAGES FLOWING FROM THE IMPROPER TRANSFER OF FUNDS.
As a bailee, Commercial Security Bank is liable,
even without a showing of negligence, for its transfer of the wired
funds to C. Harrison rather than to "F. Robertson and C.
Harrison" as directed by Pharos Enterprises.

Potomac Insurance

Co. v. Nickson, 65 Utah 395, 231 P.445 (1924); Kierce v. Farmers
Bank, 174 Ky. 22, 191 S.W. 655 (1917).

In Potomac Insurance

the Utah Supreme Court held that a bailee is liable for
conversion, even if he was not negligent, where he transfers
the bailed property to the wrong person.

In that case the

bailor who was traveling on a trip left his car with the bailor
for safe keeping overnight.

When the bailor returned the next

morning to pick up his car, it was no longer in the bailee's
possession.

At trial, the bailee defended by arguing that he

was tricked into delivering the automobile to a thief who
represented himself to be the true owner of the car by presenting
what appeared to be an authentic receipt or claim ticket.

-12-

In response the Utah court held at 448:
,f

[W]hen the defendant received the
[plaintiff's] car and issued its claim
check, he, by virtue of that act, agreed to
redeliver the car to the owner or to his
order, and to no one else. . . . In
delivering the car to [the thief], therefore,
the defendant breached his contract, and
hence the law does not inquire whether he
did so in good faith or through negligence
or otherwise. . . . [A]11 that the bailor
is required to show is that the bailee has
breached his contract by delivering the
subject of the bailment to another without
the consent of the bailor."
Application of the above rule to the instant case
requires a finding that defendant is liable for conversion.
When Pharos Enterprises delivered the cashier's check to
Commercial Security Bank and instructed it to wire the funds
to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" a bailment was created.
By so acting as a bailee, appellant agreed to deliver the funds
to the payees named on the cashier's check.
at 44 8.

Potomac Insurance

Appellant failed to deliver the funds as directed

and it is liable for conversion even without a showing of
negligence.

The facts of the instant case are not unlike the

situation where a depositer hands money to a bank teller and
instructs him to place the money in the depositer's savings
account.

No one would dispute the fact that the bank and the

teller would be responsible if the money was delivered to a
third party who absconded with it.

Neither should the

liability of the bank be disputed here.
Utah law.

Potomac Insurance.

It is required by

Indeed, the facts of this case

-13-

are even stronger for application of the rule than those in
Potomac Insurance because there the defendant was tricked
into delivering possession to the wrong person.

Here, the

wrongful delivery was a direct result of the mistake of
appellant or one of its agents.
Commercial Security Bank is also liable for the
loss of wired funds as to Respondent on a theory of negligence.
As discussed earlier, appellant has the burden of showing
that it was not negligence and it failed to meet that burden
by offering no proof on the matter.
Nomah.

Wyatt; Romney; and Clack-

In addition, respondent is liable for the acts of its

agents within the scope of their assigned duties.

Naujoks v.

Suhrmann, 9 Utah 2d 84, 337 P.2d 967 (1957); Majors v.
Butler, 99 C.A. 2d 370, 221 P.2d 994 (1950); Burgess v. Security
First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 44 C.A. 2d 808, 113 P.2d 298
(1941).

Plaintiff made out a prima facie case of negligence

by showing through the testimony of Appellant's officer that
the mistake which enabled C. Harrison to get all of the funds
had not occurred, to the officers knowledge, previously and
would not have happened if normal banking procedures had been
followed. (Tr. 55 and 60)

Even without characterizing appellant

as a bailee, the evidence on negligence offered by Respondent
at trial was sufficient for a directed verdict in light of
the fact that Commercial Security offered no evidence on
that subject.

Loer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431

P.2d 566 (1967)

The trial court did not error but correctly

found Appellant liable for the damages caused by it or
its agents.
-14-

In appellant's brief, he argues that payment to
either of two joint payees is proper and lawful when the instrument is signed by both.

Appellant overlooks the fact that

only one signature, C. Harrison's was given for receipt
of the wired funds representing a cashier's check made
payable to both "F. Robertson and C. Harrison."

On the face

of the transaction, only one signature was needed because the
bank wire that reached Idaho was made payable in the alternative.
Commercial Security, however, should not be allowed to argue
that payment to one payee on his signature alone was proper
when Commercial Security was the party responsible for the
mistake enabling the funds to be paid to only one payee.
Appellant's argument is again based on a
misconstruction of the facts.

It assumes that the issues

of this lawsuit focus on payment of a check which was
returned for insufficient funds.
that such is not the case.

The facts clearly establish

The returned check was not even

presented to Commercial Security bank the second time for
payment.

Instead, it was delivered to its maker, Pharos

Enterprises.

This lawsuit deals with the negligence of appellant

in transferring funds.

Respondents respectfully submit

that the trial court correctly directed the verdict on that
issue in their favor and ask that it be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT J. DEBRY
Attorney for Respondent
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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